Custodial Interrogation of Juveniles in the United States and Florida by Vogel, Christopher K.
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 9 | Issue 1 Article 6
Winter 1981
Custodial Interrogation of Juveniles in the United
States and Florida
Christopher K. Vogel
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Juvenile Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Christopher K. Vogel, Custodial Interrogation of Juveniles in the United States and Florida, 9 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 157 (2017) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol9/iss1/6
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION OF JUVENILES IN THE
UNITED STATES AND FLORIDA
CHRISTOPHER K. VOGEL
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout roughly the last decade a controversy over the inter-
rogation of America's children has been quietly yet persistently oc-
curring in the courtrooms across the nation.' It centers upon the
safeguards to be provided juveniles subjected to police custodial
interrogation and the admissibility of confessions elicited from a
juvenile subject to such questioning. The issue of juvenile interro-
gation first received attention in 1948 when the United States Su-
preme Court decided that minors prosecuted in adult criminal pro-
ceedings could not be interrogated by methods offensive to due
process. During the next fourteen years the movement for reform
of methods used to obtain confessions encompassed suspects of
every age. The movement centered on dissatisfaction with the vol-
untariness test used to determine the admissibility of confessions.
Reform adherents believed this test was inadequate to protect sus-
pects from coercive interrogation techniques often used by police.'
1. For a sampling of cases which contain good discussions of the rights of juveniles sub-
ject to police custodial interrogation, see Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979); Matter of
C. P., 411 A.2d 643 (D.C. 1980); State ex rel. Dino, 359 So. 2d 586 (La. 1978); Common-
wealth v. Smith, 372 A.2d 797 (Pa. 1977); People v. Lara, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1967).
2. In Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948), a 15-year-old boy was arrested around midnight
on a murder charge and confessed after being questioned by police for about five hours.
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, declared:
The age of petitioner, the hours when he was grilled, the duration of his quizzing,
the fact that he had no friend or counsel to advise him, the callous attitude of the
police towards his rights combine to convince us that this was a confession wrung
from a child by means which the law should not sanction. Neither man nor child
can be allowed to stand condemned by methods which flout constitutional re-
quirements of due process of law.
Id. at 600-01. This decision was reaffirmed fourteen years later in Gallegos v. Colorado, 370
U.S. 49 (1962). In Gallegos a 14-year-old boy was arrested for assault and robbery. After his
victim died the boy was charged with first degree murder. He was convicted largely on the
strength of a formal confession which he had given before the victim's death, prior to ap-
pearing before a judge, and after he had been held for five days without seeing an attorney,
parent, or other friendly adult, even though his mother had tried to see him. Justice Doug-
las, delivering the opinion for the Court, said that a 14-year-old boy "cannot be compared
with an adult in full possession of his senses and knowledgeable of the consequences of his
admissions .... A lawyer or an adult relative or friend could have given the petitioner the
protection which his own immaturity could not." Id. at 54. On the basis of the totality of the
circumstances in this case, the petitioner's confession was found to have been obtained in
violation of due process and his conviction was reversed. Id. at 55.
3. See generally Broderick, Interrogations and Confessions, in CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECH-
NIQUES 3-1 to 3-80 (R. Cipes ed. 1969).
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Since the test was applied by examining the totality of the circum-
stances, the discretion of the trial judges made difficult the predic-
tion of which circumstances would be found involuntary.4 The re-
form movement reached its peak in 1966 when the Court, in
Miranda v. Arizona, set forth specific criteria by which voluntari-
ness was to be measured. 6 Whether the protection was extended to
juveniles was left uncertain, 6 but the next year the Court offered
the hope that full Miranda safeguards would be extended to mi-
nors as well as adults. At this point, the controversy over juvenile
interrogations began to gain momentum. Questions raised in the
controversy included whether a juvenile had the right to confer
with a parent prior to interrogation or to have a parent or other
adult present during questioning, whether a juvenile's request for a
trusted adult was equivalent to an invocation of his right to remain
silent, and whether the totality-of-the-circumstances approach was
an effective or appropriate method to determine whether a minor's
confession or waiver of his constitutional rights was voluntary. Af-
ter many years, considerable litigation, and widespread and some-
times heated disagreement in the courtrooms, the United States
Supreme Court in 1979 was finally presented with a case which
offered the potential to settle most of the disputes.8
Following a brief outline of the development of the constitu-
tional issues, this comment will examine the Supreme Court's lat-
est statement on the privilege against self-incrimination as it ap-
plies to juveniles. In addition, the approaches of the various states
4. Id.
5. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6. See Altman, The Effect of the Miranda Case on Confessions in the Juvenile Court, 5
AM. CiuM. L.Q. 79 (1967).
7. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The Supreme Court stated:
We conclude that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is applica-
ble in the case of juveniles as it is with respect to adults. We appreciate that
special problems may arise with respect to waiver of the privilege by or on behalf
of children, and that there may well be some differences in technique-but not in
principle-depending upon the age of the child and the presence and competence
of parents. The participation of counsel will, of course, assist the police, Juvenile
Courts and appellate tribunals in administering the privilege. If counsel was not
present for some permissible reason when an admission was obtained, the greatest
care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not
only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of
ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.
Id. at 55. Thus, through Gault the full fifth amendment privilege was extended to juveniles.
Indeed, the Court noted that it would "be surprising if the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion were available to hardened criminals but not to children." Id. at 47.
8. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
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will be analyzed. Particular attention will be given to Florida's ap-
proach to juvenile interrogation. Finally, the subject of juvenile in-
terrogation will be reviewed as a whole in order to analyze the his-
tory of the present doctrine and to predict what is probable, and
perhaps preferable, in the future.
II. CONSTTUTIONAL ISSUES
The gravamen of the interrogation cases is an individual's con-
stitutional privilege against self-incrimination. This privilege is
rooted in early common laws and has always enjoyed a favored po-
sition in American jurisprudence."0 Substantial case law has devel-
oped in the effort to preserve this privilege.1" The common law re-
quired that a confession be given voluntarily before it was
admissible in evidence against an accused.12 This concept is em-
bodied in the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution,
which provides in pertinent part, "No person ...shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. '13 Al-
most every state constitution has long contained a provision basi-
cally equivalent to this amendment.14 Nevertheless, in the 1936
case of Brown v. Mississippi's the United States Supreme Court
provided for federal constitutional restraints upon state interroga-
tion procedures which were inconsistent with fundamental princi-
ples of liberty and justice.16
In reviewing objections to methods applied to elicit a confession,
the Supreme Court has applied the voluntariness test, examining
the totality of the circumstances of each case to determine whether
the confession was the product of the subject's free will.1 7 The re-
9. See generally L. LEVY, OmrGNs o Tm FirrH AMENDMENT, THE RIGHT AGAINST SMLF-
INCEuMINATION 46 (1968). See also Andersen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976); Note, Self-
Incrimination, 72 MICH. L. Rav. 84 (1973). Levy provides an excellent account of the strug-
gles of the common law courts and Parliament to establish the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. L. Lavy, supra, 43-108.
10. As evidenced by its specific inclusion in the Bill of Rights.
11. See generally J. WIGMOa, Evmzwcz § 2252 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
12. For a discussion of the common law rules regarding voluntariness of confessions, see
Comment, Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. Rxv. 935, 954 (1966).
13. U. S. CONST. amend. V. See, eg., Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892);
Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
14. See J. WIoMoRa, supra note 12, § 2252 at 319-24.
15. 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936). See U.S. CONT. amend. XIV.
16. See generally Ritz, Twenty-Five Years of State Criminal Confession Cases in the
U.S. Supreme Court, 19 WASH. & Laz L. Rzv. 35 (1962); Comment, note 12 supra.
17. For just a few notable examples, see Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962);
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961);
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suiting case law established that either physical 8 or psychological19
pressure could be found to be coercive, thereby rendering a confes-
sion involuntary. Factors considered important by the Court in de-
termining whether such pressures were applied included the use of
verbal threats,0 the length of the interrogation,"' the physical and
mental characteristics of the subject,12 and whether the subject was
kept incommunicado.28
The voluntariness test was the sole safeguard until the Court, in
Malloy v. Hogan,24 applied the self-incrimination clause of the
fifth amendment to the states by reason of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Malloy set the stage for Escobedo v. Illinois,2s in which the
Court abandoned the voluntariness test. The holding in Escobedo
was, however, given a narrow reading. The Court finally laid the
test to rest in Miranda. Once the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion became enforceable against the states, the Court began adding
other protections against coercive interrogation techniques.26 In
Escobedo v. Illinois,27 the sixth amendment right to counsel was
extended to the interrogation process.'8 Then, in Miranda, the Su-
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Haley v.
Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Lisenba v. California, 313 U.S. 537 (1941); Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
.18. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
19. See, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S.
227 (1940).
20. See, e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963).
21. See, e.g., Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367
U.S. 568 (1961).
22. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191
(1957).
23. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315 (1959); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
24. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
25. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
26. For instance, under the McNabb-Mallory rule, the Court provided that confessions
were inadmissible in federal trials if obtained by federal officers during a period of "unnec-
essary delay" in presenting a suspect before a United States Magistrate for arraignment. It
should be noted that this rule was exercised under the Court's supervisory capacity over
federal courts, was never extended to the states, and was repealed by the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1976). See generally McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
27. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
28. Prior to Escobedo, when the Court applied the totality-of-the-circumstances test to
determine the admissibility of confessions, not much emphasis was placed upon whether the
accused was permitted to have an attorney present during interrogation. Although this fac-
tor gained significance in Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958); Spano v. New York, 360
U.S. 315 (1959); and Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), it was not until Esco-
bedo that a custodial confession was actually held inadmissible because the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel was violated. This was the first hint of a constitutional per se rule and
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preme Court concluded that custodial interrogation of persons sus-
pected or accused of crimes is inherently coercive. The Court de-
clared that "protective devices" are necessary to dispel the
compulsion inherent in these circumstances" and established four
explicit warnings which must be given to an accused prior to inter-
rogation.80 The Court further ordered that once these warnings are
given,
If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or
during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interroga-
tion must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to
exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken af-
ter the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the
product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. . . . If the individual
states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease un-
til an attorney is present.8 1
As the quoted language suggests, a suspect has an absolute right to
postpone questioning by requesting an attorney. If the questioning
proceeds without the request being scrupulously honored, any
statement taken thereafter must be presumed to be a product of
compulsion. 8s
In deciding Miranda a closely divided Court established a set of
rigid prophylactic rules 8 Supporters of Miranda contend that the
rigidity of these rules provides police and courts with precise gui-
dance on the manner in which a custodial interrogation may be
conducted." On the other hand, critics of the decision claim that
the inflexibility of the Miranda rules induces lower courts to de-
velop their own "interpretations" of Miranda.8 5
the abandonment of the voluntariness test. In Miranda the hint became a full fledged
reality.
29. 384 U.S. at 458.
30. The Court mandated that: "Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned
that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evi-
dence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed." Id. at 444. An early study of the ramifications of Miranda is found in Comment,
Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519 (1967).
31. 384 U.S. at 473-74.
32. Id. at 473. See, e.g., United States v. Priest, 409 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1969) (statement
by 19-year-old inadmissible due to disregard of absolute right to delay interrogation by re-
questing counsel).
33. The Court's decision was 5-1-3 with Justice Clark concurring in part and dissenting
in part and Justices Harlan, Stewart and White dissenting.
34. Fare v. Michael C., 439 U.S. 1310, 1314 (1978).
35. Fare v. Michael C., 439 U.S. 1310 (1978). Justice Rehnquist, in his stay of enforce-
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The rationale of Miranda, however, is to protect an individual
from interrogation in overbearing circumstances where a truly vol-
untary confession is not likely to be obtained. With this perspec-
tive the application of Miranda warnings or other further protec-
tions to juveniles is not viewed by many courts as an extension of
Miranda but rather as a logical step necessary to comply with the
spirit and purpose of the Miranda rule. 6 Support for this view
seems evident in the Miranda Court's adoption of the California
Supreme Court's language regarding right to counsel: "We cannot
penalize a defendant who, not understanding his constitutional
rights, does not make the formal request [for an attorney] and by
such failure demonstrates his helplessness. 3 7 Certainly, this con-
sideration could not be more relevant than to a juvenile in trouble
questioned while in police custody and burdened with the fears
and immaturity of youth.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL IssuEs APPLIED TO JUVENILES
The unsettled constitutional issues regarding custodial interro-
gation of juveniles focus primarily upon the restraints imposed on
questioning. However, they also involve the validity of a waiver of
the right to remain silent and to have counsel available to help a
defendant effectuate his fifth amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination.8 The essence of the rationale of the privilege against
ment of judgment, acknowledged this problem and discussed the Court's rationale and its
efforts to ensure that Miranda not be extended beyond the limits imposed by the Court. Id.
at 1314-15. As examples of restricting Miranda to its "doctrinal moorings" Justice Rehn-
quist cited Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (Miranda requires narrow defini-
tion of "custodial interrogation"); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 348 (1976)
(whether investigation had "focused" on the defendant is not relevant to whether he was
entitled to Miranda warnings); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104-05 (1975) (where an
accused has asserted his right to remain silent in one questioning, he may under certain
circumstances be interrogated again); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) ("a state may
not . . . impose greater [Miranda] restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law
when this court specifically refrains from imposing them" (emphasis in original)); and Mich-
igan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 452 (1974) (evidence which is the fruit of statements made
without full Miranda warnings will not necessarily be excluded at the subsequent state
criminal trial). But c.f. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976) (prosecution may not men-
tion that the accused asserted his right to remain silent during questioning).
36. See, e.g., Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); People v. Burton, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1971).
37. 384 U.S. at 471 (quoting People v. Dorado, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 177-78 (1965)).
38. For the validity of waiver of constitutional rights see Levy & Skacevic, Valid Juve-
nile Waivers, 6 PsPPmwnsa L. Rv. 767 (1979); for discussion of the other constitutional
issues, see Ferster & Courtless, The Beginning of Juvenile Justice, Police Practices, and
the Juvenile Offender, 22 VAm. L. Rzv. 567, 591-98 (1969); Comment, Recent Develop-
ments-Criminal Law, 1972 UNIv. ILL. L. FORUM 625; and Comment, Interrogation of
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self-incrimination and of the prophylactic safeguards of Miranda is
that individuals must be protected from and the judicial system
expunged of coercive and offensive means of obtaining confessions.
As Justice Goldberg wrote for the Court in Escobedo, "[A] system
of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the 'confes-
sion' will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to
abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence inde-
pendently secured through skillful investigation."' 9 If this is so for
adults, it must apply a fortiori to juveniles, who usually have
neither the maturity nor the experience to cope with a situation
which the Supreme Court has found inherently coercive.
Despite this reasoning and the Court's positive actions to protect
adults from the potential evils of custodial interrogations, the con-
stitutional protections provided in Miranda are apparently inap-
plicable, or at least not constitutionally mandated when the sub-
ject is a juvenile. The distinction arose because juvenile
proceedings were historically based upon the doctrine of parens
patriae, and hence were deemed to be of a civil nature, designed to
treat and rehabilitate the delinquent child.'0 The privilege against
self-incrimination, however, is a shield only in criminal prosecu-
tions.41 When the distinction between "criminal" and "civil" pro-
cess was taken at face value, juveniles did not enjoy the benefit of
the substantial protections which developed under criminal proce-
dure, although they were not without the protections of due pro-
cess of law."
Juveniles: The Right to a Parent's Presence, 77 DICK. L. REv. 543 (1972-73).
39. 378 U.S. at 488-89. The same train of thought was pursued earlier by the Court in
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961), in which the Court maintained that involuntary
confessions must be disallowed "not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but
because the methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle in our criminal
law- that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system." Id. at 540-41.
40. Juvenile court systems were first established at the turn of the century. Illinois
adopted the first juvenile court act in 1899. An Act to Regulate the Treatment and Control
of Dependent, Neglected and Delinquent Children, §§ 1, 21, 1899 IMI. Laws 131 (current
version at Juvenile Court Act, Ii.. Rav. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701-08 (1971)). The Illinois statute
was formulated on the theory that youthful offenders should be treated differently than
adults. Applying the parens patriae doctrine (assuming guardianship over persons under a
disability) Illinois sought to protect the child's beat interests. Using the Illinois statutory
model, other states began enacting similar laws. For an overview of the development of the
juvenile court see THE PRzsmENTr's COMMISSION ON LAW AND ENFORcEMZTr AND ADMINMSRA-
TION OF JUsTICE, TASK FORCE REPOR. JuvEaInz DUNQUENCY AND YouTH CRmz 2 (1967).
41. For a discussion of the origins and some effects of the rule making the fifth amend-
ment applicable to criminal proceedings only, see Comment, Immunity and Subsequent In-
formal Punishment, 69 J. CiM. L. & C. 322 (1968).
42. For a treatment of the problems that this deficiency caused as well as citations to
1981]
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In In re Gault, the Supreme Court recognized the actual posi-
tion of juveniles by holding that juvenile proceedings are "crimi-
nal" for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination.4 3 Since
Gault a child has had the right to assert his privilege-that is, if he
were fortunate enough to comprehend what the privilege was and
when it ought to be asserted. Whether a minor has the capacity to
understand his rights, or the ability to assert those rights in the
face of authoritarian adult opposition (i.e., the police and some-
times his parents), and whether he can ever be said to have truly
waived his rights voluntarily in the absence of guidance from an
attorney or other informed adult interested in the child's welfare,
were all issues which Gault left open.
IV. THE JUVENILE INTERROGATION CONTROVERSY SINCE Miranda
AD Gault
Although the United States Supreme Court in Gault did not de-
cide whether Miranda warnings must be given prior to questioning
a juvenile, it indicated approval of that policy."4 Indeed, some au-
thorities suggest that children should be afforded even greater pro-
tections under the logic of Miranda than adults. 5 Since Miranda,
many related commentaries, see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
43. Id. at 49-50. The Court in Gault also held to be required: notice to the juvenile and
to his parents or guardians, id. at 31-34; opportunity for confrontation and cross-examina-
tion, id. at 56-57; and the assistance of counsel, id. at 34-42. Later, in In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970), it was held that a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was also
required. To determine whether a juvenile proceeding was sufficiently "criminal" in nature
to necessitate these procedural safeguards, the Court applies a balancing approach between
the individual and governmental interests involved. 387 U.S. at 27-28. Using the same ap-
proach in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 549 (1971), the Court found that a trial
by jury was not required in juvenile proceedings.
44. The Court said that participation of counsel would assist the police in administering
the privilege against self-incrimination and that great care must be taken in the absence of
counsel to assure that an admission was voluntary; that is, that it was neither coerced nor
suggested, nor the product of ignorance or adolescent fantasy, fright or despair. In re Gault,
387 U.S. at 55.
There are many justifications for extending the Miranda rule to minors, including the
questionable trustworthiness of confessions made by children; the difficulty of reconciling
many police practices with the concept of the state as parens patriae; the doubtful validity
of the contention that confessing is of therapeutic value to a child; and the belief that
juveniles should not be subject to any lesser standard of justice than are adults. See Ferster
& Courtless, supra note 38, at 594-95.
45. Ferster & Courtless, supra note 38, at 596. Some suggestions are that juveniles be
turned over to probation officers before questioning, that they be questioned at home; that
parents or counsel be present at questioning in all cases; that a juvenile not be allowed to
waive his Miranda rights without first conferring with parents (or other adults interested in
the child's welfare) or counsel; and that a child's request for someone other than counsel be
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some states have responded to these suggestions by adopting legis-
lation which places various limitations upon police interrogation of
juveniles." The courts have also played a role. Throughout the last
decade the judicial system has been struggling to formulate the
safeguards necessary to protect a juvenile who becomes subject to
police custodial interrogation and to articulate standards which
should be applied to determine the admissibility of a juvenile's
confession resulting from such questioning.4 7 In light of the high
percentage of serious crimes committed by minors, it is vital that
these fundamental questions of criminal procedure be definitively
settled."8
A. The Various Approaches
Courts have adopted various approaches to mitigate disadvan-
tages arising from the immaturity, inexperience, or ignorance of
the juvenile. Such approaches aim to insure that the juvenile's age
will not serve to hinder the free exercise of his right to remain si-
lent and of his right to the assistance of counsel. The most com-
mon and generally accepted approach is to examine the totality of
the circumstances of each case retrospectively in order to decide
whether a confession was freely given or was the product of some
form of coercion. This was the approach adopted by the Supreme
Court in two juvenile cases 49 preceding Miranda, but at the time
the Court was using the totality-of-the-circumstances approach to
determine the admissibility of adult confessions. Widespread dis-
satisfaction with decisions applying this approach led to its aban-
donment with regard to adults in Miranda. In its stead, police and
courts were provided with clear, mandatory rules. If a statement
was obtained in violation of these rules, it was inadmissible as evi-
dence regardless of whether it would have been admissible under
the traditional voluntariness criteria. In the juvenile system, how-
construed as an invocation of his right to remain silent and to confer with counsel prior to
further questioning. Id.
46. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 625 (West Supp. 1979); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 19-2-
102 (1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1109 (West Supp. 1979). See also Ferster & Courtless,
supra note 38, at 592.
47. See cases discussed infra.
48. Nationally, of all persons arrested in 1978, 7% were under the age of 15, 23% were
under the age of 18, and 40% were under the age of 21. If only the crime index offenses
(murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft and motor vehi-
cle theft) are considered, a staggering 58% of all people arrested in that year were under the
age of 21. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JusTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1978 184, 185 (1979).
49. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
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ever, the infinitely variable voluntariness test still reigns, complete
with all the pitfalls which were complained of prior to Miranda. It
is paradoxical that in trying to alleviate the injustices that can ac-
company custodial interrogations, the Court has left children, who
are most vulnerable to coercive pressures, without relief.
One popular approach, that of placing great emphasis upon the
presence or absence of a friendly adult during questioning, grew
out of Gallegos v. Colorado.5" In that case, a fourteen-year-old
child was held incommunicado for five days, then finally suc-
cumbed to custodial interrogation and confessed. The Supreme
Court responded, "A lawyer or an adult relative or friend could
have given the petitioner the protection [against the unequal foot-
ing between the interrogators and himself] which his own imma-
turity could not." 51 By this language, the Court seemed to recog-
nize that a minor in trouble will usually seek the aid of some adult,
and that the adult could be his parents, an attorney, a person with
a legal relationship with the child or even a friend.
This approach was adopted by the California Supreme Court in
People v. Burton." In Burton, a sixteen-year-old minor was taken
into custody on suspicion of murder and, after being advised of his
Miranda rights, was interrogated without the presence of an attor-
ney. Prior to questioning, the accused asked to consult with his
parents. This request was denied and a confession subsequently
obtained from the accused was used against him at trial.5 3 On ap-
peal from conviction, the California Supreme Court applied the
Miranda rule that if an individual indicates in any manner that he
wishes to remain silent, interrogation must cease. The California
Supreme Court had held previously in an adult interrogation case
that any conduct which "reasonably appears inconsistent with a
present willingness on the part of the suspect to discuss his case
freely and completely with police at that time" constitutes an in-
vocation of the fifth amendment privilege." Continuing that line of
reasoning, the Burton court held that it would be a severe restric-
tion of the protective devices of Miranda if the only call for help
by a minor which would invoke his privilege was a call for an attor-
50. 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
51. Id. at 54. A sentence later the Court said that without "some" adult protection a
juvenile would be unable to know, let alone assert, his constitutional rights. Id.
52. 99 Cal. Rptr. 1.
53. Id. at 4.
54. People v. Randall, 83 Cal. Rptr. 658, 663 (1970) (emphasis in original).
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ney.as Indeed, the court considered it "fatuous" to expect a minor
in custody to call an attorney for assistance and unrealistic to at-
tach no significance to his call for help from persons to whom he
normally looks when he is in trouble-that is, his parents or
guardians. 6
Another way to protect i juvenile from coercive interrogations is
to require that his rights be conveyed to him in simplified language
which he is capable of understanding."' An empirical study was
conducted to discover whether the Miranda rights could be simpli-
fied for a juvenile and whether a minor has the capacity to know-
ingly and intelligently waive those rights.58 The results were dis-
couraging, if not surprising, in that no significant increase in
comprehension was detected between minors given the formal Mi-
randa rights and those presented with the simplified version.0 '
A third approach emphasizes the capacity of a juvenile to know-
ingly and intelligently waive his rights. Under this approach vari-
ous prerequisites are imposed before a valid waiver is recognized.
For example, in State ex rel. Dino,1" the court held invalid a mur-
der confession by a thirteen-year-old boy. The boy had been ad-
vised of his Miranda rights but had waived them. The court held
that the state has a heavy burden to demonstrate that the waiver
was knowingly and intelligently made.61 To sustain this burden,
the court required a showing that the juvenile consulted with an
attorney or an adult before waiver, that the attorney or adult was
interested in the juvenile's welfare, or, if the adult consulted was
not an attorney, that the adult was fully advised of the juvenile's
rights.62 As stated by a judge in a similar case, "I cannot fathom
55. 99 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
56. Id. at 9.
57. See Levy & Skacevic, supra note 38, at 776-78.
58. Ferguson & Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 39 (1969).
59. Id. at 48. One area, analogous because of its concern over the comprehension of re-
cipients of important legal information, and which has been the object of many empirical
studies, is that of devising jury instructions. Tests have shown that even college students
(including a study using law students) have considerable difficulty understanding jury in-
structions. Simplification of the instructions was found to have very little positive impact
upon comprehension. See, e.g., Aitken, Jury Instruction Process 49 MARQUETM L. Rzv.
137-48 (1965); O'Mara & Eckartsberg, Proposed Standardization of Instructions, 48' PA.
B.A.Q. 542-56 (1977). If college students cannot understand simple legal instructions, it is
difficult to believe that juveniles can appreciate the meaning and significance of their rights.
60. 359 So. 2d 586 (La. 1978).
61. Id. at 594.
62. Id. A similar rule was established by a series of decisions in Pennsylvania, outlined
in Commonwealth v. Smith, 372 A.2d 797, 803 (Pa. 1977). In Smith, the conviction of a 17-
year-old boy for the murder of a 14-year-old girl and the shooting of her friend, both inno-
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how a minor, who lacks the capacity to sell, mortgage, donate or
release (who could not even contract with the lawyer whose ser-
vices he waives) can be said to possess the capacity to waive consti-
tutional privileges and lose his freedom as a consequence." 5 In the
Dino case, the juvenile did not consult with an attorney or other
adult prior to waiving his rights."
Thus, self-incrimination by a juvenile typically raises related is-
sues of coercion, and of capacity, in connection with assessing the
effect of a formal waiver of the privilege. 6 Prior to Dino, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in People v. Lara" treated the issue thor-
oughly and concluded that minors were not incompetent as a mat-
ter of law to waive their privilege. In Lara, a seventeen-year-old
was convicted of kidnapping and murder, in part on the basis of
incriminating confessions given after the defendant waived his
rights.6 He contended upon appeal that he lacked the capacity to
make a voluntary confession or to understandingly and intelli-
gently waive his rights. The court disagreed, stating:
We cannot accept the suggestion of certain commentators ...
that every minor is incompetent as a matter of law to waive his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to an attorney unless
the waiver is consented to by an attorney or by a parent or guard-
ian who has himself been advised of the minor's rights."
Rather, the court claimed that with respect to criminal acts of mi-
nors, there was no blanket presumption of incapacity. A juvenile's
immaturity was seen simply as one element among many which
must be considered to determine his liability; the totality-of-the-
circumstances approach was endorsed'e
cent bystanders to a youth gang war, was reversed on the grounds that the waiver of his
Miranda rights was ineffective since it was given without consultation with an informed
adult interested in the juvenile's welfare. Id.
63. State ex rel. Holifield, 319 So. 2d 471, 475 (La. App. 1975) (Fedoroff, J., concurring).
64. 359 So. 2d at 594.
65. See, e.g., Levy & Skacevic and Comment, Recent Developments-Criminal Law,
note 38 supra.
66. 62 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1967).
67. Id. at 590, 591.
68. Id. at 596 (citing Comment, Miranda Guarantees in the California Juvenile Courts,
7 SAWTA CLARA LAW. 114 (1967); Comment, The Juvenile Offender and Self-Incrimination,
40 WAsH. L. RPy. 189 (1965)).
69. 62 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
JUVENILE INTERROGATION
B. The United States Supreme Court's
Answer: Fare v. Michael C.
In Fare v. Michael C.,7 0 the United States Supreme Court had
an opportunity to settle virtually all of the self-incrimination is-
sues which had arisen with respect to juveniles since In re Gault.
Essentially three issues were presented: (1) whether the juvenile's
request to see his probation officer constituted an invocation of his
right to remain silent, and, if so, whether further interrogation was
only permissible if his right to cut off questioning was scrupulously
honored; (2) whether the juvenile's request to see his probation of-
ficer constituted the legal equivalent of an invocation of his right
to counsel to effectuate his fifth amendment privilege against self
incrimination, and if so, whether all interrogation must cease until
his attorney or probation officer was present; and (3) assuming no
invocation of a right to remain silent or a right to the equivalent of
counsel, was there a valid waiver of fifth amendment rights; i.e.,
how much weight is to be given to the fact that before talking he
asked to see his probation officer.
Respondent Michael C., a sixteen-year-old. minor, was implicated
in a murder which occurred during a robbery of the victim's
home.71 He was taken into custody and interrogated by the police
at the Van Nuys police station.72 At the time the respondent was
on probation to the juvenile court and had been so since the age of
twelve. 78 After being advised of his Miranda rights the accused
asked if he could have his probation officer present at the ques-
tioning. He was told that he could not have his probation officer
there at that time but that he did have a right to an attorney.
Michael C. then asked, "How I know you guys won't pull no police
officer in and tell me he's an attorney?"74 Without answering his
question, the police ascertained who his probation officer was, re-
peated that he would not be called at that time and that the re-
spondent did not have to talk to the police without an attorney
present. The respondent stated that he understood this right and
agreed to talk to the police. In response to police questioning he
subsequently made statements and drew sketches that incrimi-
nated him in the murder.75
70. 442 U.S. 707 (1979), rev'g 146 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1978).
71. 442 U.S. at 709.
72. 146 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
73. 442 U.S. at 710.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 727-28.
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Presented with a minor who had been read his Miranda rights,
had not requested an attorney, but had requested the presence of a
trusted adult (his probation officer),7 the question of Michael C.'s
capacity to comprehend the Miranda warnings and to knowingly
and intelligently waive his constitutional rights was squarely
raised. The trial court concluded on the basis of the totality-of-
the-circumstances approach that Michael C.'s confession was vol-
untary." Michael C. was adjudged to be a ward of the court and
committed to the Youth Authority. S
On appeal, the California Supreme Court held that a minor's re-
quest at the commencement of interrogation to see his probation
officer was a per se invocation of his fifth amendment rights under
Miranda.79 The court found the probation officer in this instance
to be a trusted guardian figure. Respondent's probation officer tes-
tified at trial that he had instructed Michael C. to contact him im-
mediately at any time that he had police contact. Thus, it was con-
sidered a "normal reaction" for Michael C. to seek the advice of his
probation officer.8 0 By analogy to Burton, then, respondent's "call
for help" via his request for his probation officer was deemed to be
an indication that he intended to invoke his fifth amendment
privilege.81
On the record before it in Michael C., the United States Su-
preme Court could reach the merits of all the issues involved in the
controversy over the safeguards to be afforded a juvenile subject to
police custodial interrogation. Unfortunately, the court in a five to
four decision chose to use Michael C. as a vehicle to prevent the
extension of Miranda. It held that a determination as to whether
the respondent waived or invoked his fifth amendment privilege is
an issue of fact dependent upon the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation.83
Three dissenting justices of the United States Supreme Court
found the California Supreme Court's decision in In re Michael C.
76. Id. at 710.
77. Id. at 712.
78. 146 Cal. Rptr. at 364, n.1. Judge Martin issued the opinion of the trial court. Her
sensitivity to constitutional issues is evidenced by her publication of widely used handbooks
on search and seizure issues. See, e.g., MARTIN, COMPREHENSIVE CA IFORNIA SEARCH &
SmzuRw (1971).
79. 146 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
80. Id. at 361.
81. Id. at 360-61.
82. 442 U.S. at 728.
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to be convincing." In fact, they were inclined to pursue this ratio-
nale to an even greater extent. They noted that the United States
Supreme Court has consistently recognized that "the greatest
care" must be taken to ensure that a juvenile will not be subject to
overbearing interrogation tactics and that any alleged confessions
are actually voluntarily made." Further, they endorsed the view
espoused in Gallegos that a juvenile suspect may not be equated
with an adult who is in full possession of his senses and knowledge-
able of the consequences of his admissions. 85 The Court in Gal-
legos recognized that a minor will seek aid from some adult, but it
did not limit the minor's choices to his parents, an attorney, or a
person with a legal relationship such as a probation officer, as did
the California court.8"
These dissenting justices believed it was especially critical when
dealing with juveniles that Miranda's requirements be construed
broadly enough to fulfill the intent of eliminating the compulsion
inherent in custodial interrogations. The minimum requirement to
even raise an issue of voluntary confession should be the availabil-
ity of legal counsel, and any intimation of a minor's desire to pre-
clude questioning must be scrupulously honored. Continuing this
thought, Justice Marshall concluded that a juvenile's request for
an adult who is obligated to represent his interests is both an at-
tempt to obtain advice and an invocation of the fifth amendment
right to silence. At the very least, the request for adult assistance
is inconsistent with a present desire on the part of the suspect to
speak freely with the police. 8 Hence, the request should be
deemed a per se assertion of the minor's constitutional rights and
Miranda should require that the interrogation cease whenever
such a request is made." As suggested by the Fifth Circuit, in Cha-
ney v. Wainwright,8 ' to hold otherwise would protect the knowl-
edgeable accused who realizes he must ask for an attorney while
abandoning the juvenile who knows no more than to ask for a per-
son he trusts.9 In addition, an absolute standard would provide
83. Justice Marshall wrote the dissent in which Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens
joined. 442 U.S. at 728. As an aside, it is interesting to note that Justice Brennan is the sole
remaining justice of the Miranda Court and was with the majority in that case.
84. 442 U.S. at 729.
85. Id.
86. 370 U.S. at 54.
87. 442 U.S. at 730.
88. Id. at 729-30.
89. 561 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1977).
90. 442 U.S. at 730.
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clear-cut guidelines for interrogations.
Justice Powell, also dissenting, would have affirmed the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's decision although he believed that court mis-
construed Miranda. His disagreement with the California court
was with its holding that a juvenile's request for his probation of-
ficer constitutes a per se invocation of his fifth amendment rights.
Justice Powell agreed with the majority that the totality of the cir-
cumstances of the interrogation should be examined to determine
whether the accused invoked his privilege. He believed that the
record clearly revealed that the admission was not the product of a
fair interrogation free from inherently coercive circumstances.9
But the majority in Michael C. continued a policy of restricting
the Miranda exclusionary rule to its original doctrinal moorings."
They maintained that the per se rule established in Miranda was
based on the Court's perception that an attorney occupies a critical
position in our legal system because of his unique ability to protect
the fifth amendment rights of a client facing custodial interroga-
tion. While reaffirming this view and reciting the sound reasons for
affording an attorney this special status, the Court refused to
equate a probation officer with a lawyer and especially rejected the
contention that any adult could provide a minor with the same
protection as could counsel.'3
91. Id. at 734.
92. See also Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104-07 (1975); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S.
714, 719 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446-52 (1974); Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971).
93. 442 U.S. at 722. The Court's position represents a retreat from its earlier language in
Gault and Galegos, in which it was intimated that any informed adult interested in a par-
ticular juvenile's welfare could provide the minor the assistance needed to be at parity with
his interrogators. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 55; Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 54. The Court's current
stand, however, is consistent with the reality seen in some cases, in which a parent or
trusted adult fails to serve the child's beat interests. As pointed out by one commentator
there are a variety of reasons why the presence of a juvenile's parents or other concerned
adult will not necessarily help safeguard the minor's rights. Adults also may not understand
the Miranda warnings or may be intimidated by police surroundings, especially adults who
are themselves law abiding citizens with little or no exposure to the judicial system other
than an occasional traffic citation. Additionally, the juvenile may feel pressured to confess in
order to exonerate himself before his parent. Finally, an adult may insist that the juvenile
cooperate because it is the "right" thing to do. Comment, Recent Developments-Criminal
Law, supra note 38, at 631. There is considerable case law supporting this last point. Some
cases from Florida are illustrative, e.g., Postell v. State, 383 So. 2d 1159, 1160 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1980) (13-year-old girl convicted of second-degree murder, burglary and robbery,
largely on the basis of her confession which was given after her mother told her to "tell the
police everything"); Anglin v. State, 259 So. 2d 752, 752 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (15-
year-old boy confessed after his mother told him to tell "the truth" or "she would clobber
him"). The court, in Anglin, found the mother's concern for the basic precepts of morality
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From their premises regarding the special status of lawyers, the
Court considered it error to find that a juvenile's request to speak
with his probation officer constituted per se an invocation of his
fifth amendment rights. It admitted that the request was a factor
to be taken into account, but declined to find it dispositive."
The Court then determined that the totality-of-the-circum-
stances approach was adequate to ascertain whether a minor has
waived his fifth amendment rights prior to interrogation. On the
record before them the Court found that the respondent voluntar-
ily and knowingly waived his rights and consented to continued
interrogation, thereby rendering his admissions valid and admissi-
ble in court against him."'
The majority's main concern in Michael C. was to squelch what
it perceived as an unwarranted expansion of Miranda through ju-
dicial interpretation by lower courts." While most jurisdictions
have allowed a minor to waive his fifth amendment privileges with-
out an adult's guidance and have followed a totality-of-the-circum-
stances approach to determine the admissibility of a minor's con-
fession and the validity of his waiver, several jurisdictions have
held otherwise.97 In Michael C., the majority limited Miranda to
its specific holding and sent a message to lower courts that it will
not tolerate a state's imposing greater Miranda restrictions when
the Supreme Court refrains from imposing them. 8 To those who
to be commendable and did not consider her admonition to constitute a threat or coercion.
See also Daniels v. State, 174 S.E.2d 422 (Ga. 1970); Mack v. State, 188 S.E.2d 828 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1972); Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 H~Av. L. REv. 42
(1968); Comment, Interrogation of Juveniles: The Right to a Parent's Presence, 77 DiCK. L.
REV. 543 (1972-73).
94. 442 U.S. at 719-24.
95. Id. at 726-27. See also North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979). In Butler the
suspect agreed to talk to his interrogators but refused to sign a written waiver form. The
Court held that an express waiver of Miranda rights is not necessary. It found that in cer-
tain circumstances a waiver may be inferred from the actions and words of the suspect. 441
U.S. at 373. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens dissented, arguing that Miranda
should be interpreted to require an express waiver. Id. at 377.
96. See also Fare v. Michael C., 439 U.S. 1310 (1978) (application for stay pending filing
of petition for certiorari).
97. See generally Levy & Skacevic, note 38 supra.
98. The Court delivered essentially the same message recently in Rhode Island v. Innis,
100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980). That case dealt mainly with the definition of "interrogation." While
the Court acknowledged that "the Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in
custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police practices" the Court
defined interrogation narrowly, finding that "since the police surely cannot be held account-
able for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation
can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have
known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Id. at 1690 (emphasis in
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believed that juveniles need and are entitled to at least equal, if
not greater, protections than most adults, the Court's reply was:
not at the expense of expanding Miranda.se
V. THE JUVENILE INTERROGATION CONTROVERSY IN FLORIDA
Florida, like several other states,100 has adopted a statute provid-
ing certain protections to juveniles who become subject to police
custodial interrogation. The approach used in Florida to determine
the admissibility of confessions made by juveniles during such
questioning has been predicated largely on statutory construction
without reaching the constitutional issues involved. 10 1 Legislative
changes of the statute over time102 and differences of opinion over
original). Interestingly, the three dissenting justices who joined in Michael C. and Butler
against the majority's restrictive interpretation of Miranda (Justices Marshall, Brennan and
Stevens), also dissented in Innis apparently for the same reasons. Id. at 1692, 1693. How-
ever, in Innis, Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent. Id. at 1693.
99. In an interesting article, Streib, From Gault to Fare and Smith: The Decline in
Supreme Court Reliance on Delinquency Theory, 7 PEPPEmDINE L. REv. 801 (1980), it is
established that the Court has reached its recent conclusions regarding juveniles without
reliance upon delinquency research. The article concludes, "Particularly in the instance of
Fare, the Court has regressed to narrow, legalistic conclusions and broad, seat-of-the-pants
conjecture." Id. at 826. While Streib's article does not focus especially upon the interroga-
tion of juveniles, it does do a thorough job of examining the Court's use of delinquency
research in arriving at its holdings in juvenile cases. The footnotes of this article are a vir-
tual bibliography of all the sources which have been relied upon in juvenile cases which have
been heard by the Court since Gault.
100. The legislative protections provided by several other states are discussed in Ferster
& Courtless, supra note 38 at 592-94.
101. FLA. STAT. § 39.03(3) (1979) provides:
If the person taking the child into custody determines, pursuant to 39.032(2), that
the child should be detained or placed in a crisis home, that person shall make a
reasonable effort to immediately notify the parents or legal custodians of the child
and shall, without unreasonable delay, deliver the child to the appropriate intake
officer or, if the court has so ordered, to a detention home or crisis home.
It was preceded by several other versions, the most notable of which is discussed infra.
In Florida, it is apparently a matter of common practice, although not a requirement, to
read a juvenile the Miranda warnings whenever it would be appropriate for adults. Also,
pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 39.03(3) (1979) and its predecessors, until very recently most cases
held that the parent or guardian of a minor had to be notified and provided with an oppor-
tunity to confer with the child prior to interrogation. See generally 8 FLA. ST. UNIv. L. Rv.
99 (1980) which analyzes the recent decision of Davis v. Page, 442 F. Supp. 258 (S.D. Fla.
1977). The case-by-case approach argued for in this note is fairly consistent with the ration-
ale of Michael C. The Florida Supreme Court is definitely shy of a per se or absolute rule
when it involves interrogation. See Doerr v. State, 383 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1980); Davis v. Page,
442 F. Supp. 258 (S.D. Fla. 1977). The Fifth Circuit would be most in step with the United
States and Florida Supreme Court rulings by adopting the case-by-case rather than the
absolute approaches to a juvenile's right to appointed counsel. 8 FLA. ST. UNIv. L. Rav. at
101.
102. There have been several minor changes in this statute over time. However, the only
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the construction and the rationale or purpose of the statute have
resulted in divergent views among the district courts of appeal. 103
The dispute has recently climaxed in Doerr v. State10 4 a case aris-
ing out of the Second District Court of Appeal and decided by the
Florida Supreme Court on May 8, 1980. The court based its deci-
sion squarely upon its interpretation of section 39.03(3), Florida
Statutes.10 5
A. Section 39.03(3): The Interpretations
of the District Courts of Appeal
Florida courts generally agree that for a confession to be admis-
sible in evidence in a juvenile case it must be voluntarily made, as
measured by the totality-of-the-circumstances method of deter-
mining voluntariness and not by the Miranda rules.'"e However,
when the question is raised whether a juvenile's confession is ad-
missible if it was given prior to notification of his parents, the
agreement among the courts ends.
The former version of the statute explicitly provided:
The person taking and retaining a child in custody shall notify
the parents ... and shall, without delay for the purpose of in-
vestigation or any other purpose, deliver the child, by the most
direct practicable route, to the court of the county or district
where the child is taken into custody."'
significant revision was made between 1971 and 1973, with the deletion of the words "with-
out delay for the purpose of investigation or any other purpose" (ch. 71-355, § 10, 1971 Fla.
Laws 1597; ch. 71-130, § 2, 1971 Fla. Laws 337) and their replacement with the milder re-
quirement that the police "immediately notify the parents ... and ... without unreasona-
ble delay, deliver the child to the appropriate intake officer." Ch. 73-231, §§ 4-9, 1973 Fla.
Laws 527 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 39.03(3) (1979)).
103. Compare Doerr v. State, 348 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977), afl'd, 383 So.
2d 905 (Fla. 1980) with Fields v. State, 377 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
104. 383 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1980).
105. (1979).
106. See In re G. G. P., 382 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980). See also C.J. v.
State, 376 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Tennell v. State, 348 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1977); T. B. v. State, 306 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975); J. D. D. v.
State, 268 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Arnold v. State, 265 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1972). The general agreement over the use of the totality-of-the-circum-
stances test extends as well to the capacity of a minor to waive his rights under Miranda.
The Second District Court of Appeal, in T. B. v. State, 306 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1975), cited Gallegos and Lara in support of these positions.
107. Ch. 59-441, § 1, 1959 Fla. Laws 1471 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 39.03(3)
(1979)).
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Judicial interpretation of this version was uniform. In In re
A.J.A.,'0 a sixteen-year-old boy was picked up on a charge of rob-
bery. Accompanied by his mother, he was taken by officers to the
public safety department building. After a considerable wait, an
officer informed the mother that the boy was under arrest and in-
structed her to go home, which she did. The boy was later interro-
gated for approximately two hours by two officers of the Public
Safety Department, culminating in a signed confession to the of-
fense charged. 10 ' The Third District Court of Appeal construed the
above statute as a legislative directive that presumptively inexperi-
enced juveniles suspected of criminal conduct must be treated dif-
ferently from adults in a similar position and should not be ex-
posed to the intimidating influences of a jail or a police station.
For this reason the confession was found to be inadmissible and
the lower court decision allowing its admission was reversed. 1 0
The Florida Supreme Court in Roberts v. State" ' adopted the ra-
tionale of In re A. J. A., noting that the statutory language was
controlling.1 I
The same year that Roberts was decided, however, the Florida
Legislature revised the statute, substituting a milder and less ex-
plicit requirement:
If the person taking the child into custody determines pursuant
to section 39.03(3)(c), that the child should be detained or placed
in shelter care, he shall notify immediately the parents or legal
custodians of the child and shall, without unreasonable delay, de-
liver the child to the appropriate intake officer, or, if the judge
has so ordered, to a detention home or shelter.'"
Judicial uniformity collapsed in its wake. According to the First
and Third District Courts of Appeal, the statute required that a
parent be notified and permitted to consult with a juvenile prior to
questioning.1 14 The Second and Fourth District Courts of Appeal
108. 248 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
109. Id. at 691.
110. Id. at 692.
111. 285 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1973).
112. Id. at 386. The court noted that it was compelled to take this position due to the
explicit statutory language. That same year the Florida Legislature redrafted the statute
substituting milder language. See note 102 supra.
113. Ch. 73-231, 1973 Fla. Laws 527, §§ 4-9.
114. Stokes v. State, 371 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Sublette v. State, 365
So. 2d 775 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Weatherspoon v. State, 328 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Dowst v. State, 336 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
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contended that the revised statute merely requires notification of
parents when a child is "taken into custody," and establishes no
preconditions for interrogations.1 15
The First District Court of Appeal has heard the most litigation
in this area." 6 In the earliest case, Weatherspoon v. State,", a sev-
enteen-year-old youth was taken into custody for suspicion of rob-
bery. His parents arrived at the police station within a half hour
and requested to see the boy. They were forced to wait for approxi-
mately five hours, during which time the police officers extracted a
confession from the juvenile.11 8 Although Miranda warnings were
given prior to questioning, the youth's conviction on two counts of
robbery was reversed on grounds that his confession was inadmissi-
ble because it was obtained in violation of his rights under the
statute.11' Nine days later the same court heard a similar case,
Dowst v. State,1 20 in which a sixteen-year-old was arrested on sus-
picion of grand larceny. The boy requested permission to call his
parents but was not allowed to do so until after he had been inter-
rogated. Under questioning he made statements which led to his
conviction."" Citing the statute, the court said:
The purpose of the Statute is too clear to call for interpretation
or construction. The Legislature has commanded with clear words
that a juvenile's parents shall be notified immediately, and it is
not left to the discretion of the arresting or interrogating officer
to suspend the operation of this legislative mandate until after he
obtains confessions from the youth. In such posture, the giving of
the Miranda rights to the Defendant was to no avail."22
The court held that the defendant's request to call his parents con-
stituted a continuous assertion of his privilege against self-incrimi-
nation 18 and that his confession, given after denial of his request,
was inadmissible in evidence."' In re A. J. A. and Roberts were
115. Doerr v. State, 348 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977), affid, 383 So. 2d 905
(Fla. 1980); In re W.J.N., 350 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
116. See cases discussed infra. By comparison, the other district courts have had no
more than one case each on point.
117. 328 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
118. Id. at 876.
119. Id.
120. 336 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
121. Id. at 376.
122. Id. (emphasis in original).
123. See also People v. Burton, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971).
124. 336 So. 2d at 376.
1981]
178 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
cited as authority, even though they both had been decided on the
basis of the prior version of the statute.'
Relying and expanding upon the rationale of Dowst, the First
District Court of Appeal in Stokes v. State12 held that where a
parent requests to be present at an interrogation of his child, and
the parent is reasonably accessible, then the statute requires that
the parent be given a reasonable opportunity to be present and to
confer with the child. In Stokes, the appellant cut another juvenile
with a knife during an argument. The police took the appellant
and all the witnesses to the Juvenile Justice Center for question-
ing. Before leaving for the Center the police informed the appel-
lant's father that his son was being taken for questioning. The fa-
ther told the officers that he wanted to be present at the
questioning, and that he would get there as soon as he was able to
calm his wife. Although the father arrived within a reasonable pe-
riod of time, the officer waited only a few minutes before com-
mencing interrogation without the father. The victim subsequently
died and the appellant was convicted of manslaughter.2 7 Appel-
lant's motion to supress his statements made during questioning
was denied.12 8 His conviction was reversed on appeal due to the
officer's failure to comply with the statute, thus rendering the juve-
nile's statements inadmissible.' 2 ' The First District Court of Ap-
peal has made it clear that Stokes, Dowst and Weatherspoon are
controlling in the first district as to the question of admissibility of
a juvenile's confession obtained after Miranda warnings are given,
but prior to delivery of the minor to the intake officer of a juvenile
detention center.3 0 That court's position was maintained despite a
125. Id. But c.f In re R. L. J., 336 So. 2d 132, 138 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (lower
court decision reversed because statements made by minor in sheriff's office were not the
product of free choice). R. L. J. was decided only four months after Dowst. However, the
court also noted in dicta that under the revised statute it was evident that the legislature
removed statutory impediments to juvenile custodial interrogation which is not offensive to
the United States or Florida Constitutions. 336 So. 2d at 137. But this language is inconsis-
tent with other First District Court of Appeal interpretations. See, e.g., K. L. C. v. State,
379 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Fields v. State, 377 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1979); Stokes v. State, 371 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
126. 371 So. 2d 131, 132 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
127. Id. at 132.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. K. L. C. v. State, 379 So. 2d 455, 455 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Fields v. State,
377 So. 2d 223, 224 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979). The court in K. L. C. maintained that the
police have an obligation under the statute to notify the parents when a juvenile is arrested,




holding to the contrary by the Second District Court of Appeal.
The contrary second district case was Doerr v. State,131 in which
a sixteen-year-old minor was charged with three counts of bur-
glary. A police officer, seeking to arrest Doerr, first advised Doerr's
mother of his intentions. Later that evening Doerr was arrested by
the officer. Petitioner's rights were read to him once in the patrol
car enroute to the juvenile detention center, and again prior to his
interrogation at the detention center. In response to questioning,
Doerr confessed to participation in several burglaries and provided
the officer with substantiating details. Later, Doerr's motion to
supress his statements made to the arresting officer was denied and
he pled nolo contendere.18 2 On appeal, Doerr argued that under the
statute his confession was automatically inadmissible since his par-
ents were not notified prior to his interrogation.138 The Second
District Court of Appeal disagreed. Dowst was distinguished on its
facts, since there the juvenile requested that the police contact his
parents whereas here no such request was made.' Finally, the
court also distinguished Roberts on the ground that the statute on
which the Roberts decision rested had been revised and the court
was not bound by the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of
the former section's stricter language.138 The court noted that
while the fact that a juvenile's confession was given prior to his
conferring with a parent or attorney is a factor militating against
its admissibility, this fact alone does not preclude a finding of vol-
untariness on the basis of the other circumstances under which the
confession was made. 86
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, in In re W. J. N., 5
adopted the rationale of the second district court and declared
that a delay in notification of a juvenile's parents is merely one
factor to be considered by the trial court in making its determina-
131. 348 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977), affd, 383 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1980).
132. Id. at 939.
133. Id. at 939-40.
134. Id. at 940.
135. Id. at 941. As support, the court cited In re R. L. J.
136. Id. at 940-41.
137. 350 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977). Interestingly, the court in W. J. N.
cited In re R. L. J., 371 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979), as primary support for its
holding and Doerr v. State, 348 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977), aff'd, 383 So. 2d
905 (Fla. 1980), as merely "[s]ee also." Yet, the supportive language in R. L. J. was dicta
whereas the supportive language in Doerr was essential to the holding in that case. The only
explanation for this is that the court in W. J. N. wanted to emphasize the only First District
Court of Appeal case which supported the view that no statutory requirement of notification
of a parent prior to custodial interrogation of a minor exists.
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tion of voluntariness.13 8 The appellant, age sixteen, arguing that
his confession should have been suppressed, relied upon In re A. J.
A., Roberts v. State and B. M. v. State."5 9 The court declared the
first two cases inapplicable because they were based upon an ear-
lier version of the statute. 40 In B. M. v. State, the current version
of the statute was found to be a legislative directive that juveniles
must be treated differently from other suspected criminals in that
they shall not be taken to a police station or to jail for interroga-
tion.1 41 The Fourth District Court of Appeal found this language
to be merely dicta.""'
The Third District Court of Appeal in Sublette v. State,1 43
meanwhile aligned itself with the first district's interpretation. In
Sublette, as in Dowst, the police refused to grant the juvenile's
request to contact his father until after questioning. During the
ensuing interrogation the minor made statements which were in-
strumental in convicting him for first degree murder, robbery, bur-
glary and petty larceny.144 On appeal the appellant's request for
his father was found to be a continuous assertion of his privilege
against self-incrimination and denial of the request was found to
be contrary to the requirements of the statute, thereby rendering
his subsequent statements inadmissible as evidence. 45 However,
the decision was closely divided, the minority joining with the sec-
ond district 1 46 which, in Doerr, had arrived at a contrary interpre-
tation of the same statute under similar factual circumstances.
B. The Florida Supreme Court's Answer: Doerr v. State
As a result of Doerr, the Second District Court of Appeal certi-
fied the following question to the Florida Supreme Court for reso-
lution: "Is any confession by a juvenile after he is taken into cus-
tody rendered inadmissible if it was given prior to notification of
his parents .. .pursuant to section 39.03(3)(a), Florida Statutes
138. 350 So. 2d at 120.
139. 337 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
140. Id.
141. 337 So. 2d at 424.
142. 350 So. 2d at 120. This was a proper reading of B. M. The court remanded the case
because the trial judge's conclusion that the confession was voluntary did not appear in the
record with unmistakable clarity as required. See McDole v. State, 283 So. 2d 553 (Fla.
1973).
143. 365 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
144. Id. at 776.
145. Id. at 777.
146. Id. at 778 (Pearson, J., dissenting in part).
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(1975)?'7 In a four to three decision, the supreme court con-
curred with the second district, answering the question in the neg-
ative. The majority adopted verbatim the district court's ration-
ale," 8 which essentially was that the only purpose of the statute, as
revised, is to keep parents advised of their child's whereabouts
while the child is in state custody. The court categorically stated
that "the statutory requirement of notification has nothing to do
with interrogation."1 4 It went on to say that "the admissibility of
a juvenile confession depends upon the totality of circumstances
under which it was made." 50 The court held specifically that the
statute neither prohibits interrogation after a child is taken into
custody but before a decision is made whether to detain him nor
does it prohibit interrogation after a determination to detain is
made. " Whether the child's parents are notified prior to question-
ing is simply one factor for the trial court to consider in determin-
ing the voluntariness of any child's confession."'
The Florida Supreme Court's decision was based solely upon
construction of the statute.1" The court's earlier decision in Rob-
erts, under the previous version of that statute, was also grounded
solely upon the statute involved. Although there are important
constitutional issues underlying this statute, as is evident from the
controversy in other states, the Florida courts have not yet found
it necessary to reach these fundamental issues. For instance, in
Doerr no mention was made at all to Michael C., decided eleven
months earlier. Yet the end result achieved in Doerr by the major-
ity is essentially the same as that in Michael C. In both instances
the totality-of-the-circumstances approach was endorsed and the
question of whether a child has the right to see an adult prior to
questioning, other than an attorney, was answered in the negative.
Interestingly, the dissent in Michael C. cited Gallegos as partial
support for the proposition that juveniles who request to see an
adult prior to questioning should be deemed to have invoked their
fifth amendment privilege.'" They believed this result followed
from the Court's language proposing adult aid as a safeguard
147. 383 So. 2d at 906.
148. Id. at 906-07. See Doerr v. State, 348 So. 2d 938, 940-41 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1977), affd, 383 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1980).
149. 383 So. 2d at 907.
150. Id. (citing Gallegos).
151. Id. at 908.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 906.
154. 442 U.S. at 729.
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against a minor's immaturity. Yet, in Doerr, the majority cited
Gallegos as support for using the totality-of-the-circumstances ap-
proach.1 55 Applying that approach the court found that the statute
had nothing to do with interrogations and that a child's request for
a parent is merely another circumstance for the trial court to con-
sider in determining the voluntariness of a minor's confession. 1"
It is questionable whether the closely divided decision of the
Florida court will end the controversy in Florida. However, it ap-
pears that the advocates of greater procedural protections for
juveniles now will face an uphill battle. They have only two alter-
natives. First, they can continue to challenge the court's interpre-
tation of the statute, either hoping for a current justice to change
his opinion or waiting for a new justice with views in accord with
their own. Second, they can switch their attack from statutory to
constitutional grounds. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Michael C. this avenue does not offer much chance for success.
Considering the closely divided decisions of both Doerr and
Michael C., the arguments which eventually heralded the demise
of the voluntariness test for adults, and the paradoxical situation
in which children who are most in need of protection are given the
most inferior type, ample justification appears to exist for continu-
ation of the controversy.
VI. CONCLUSION
The question of what procedural safeguards should be afforded
to juveniles subject to police custodial interrogation has been a ma-
jor source of controversy in juvenile law since Miranda and Gault
were decided. In Michael C. the Supreme Court had the opportu-
nity to settle the matter, but chose instead to direct its efforts at
curbing the heretofore active judicial expansion of Miranda.
Although Michael C. was decided by a closely divided Court, it
is still likely to have a negative impact upon those jurisdictions
which have attempted to protect juveniles by requiring that a mi-
nor have adult guidance before his confession or his waiver of con-
stitutional rights would be deemed valid. It is also likely to deter
other jurisdictions from venturing forward in this troubled area.
While Michael C. specifically held that a minor's request for his
probation officer was not equivalent to a request for an attorney or
a desire to invoke his right to remain silent, it seems clear from the
155. 383 So. 2d at 907.
156. Id.
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Court's language and rationale that the same result would have
been reached if a parent or other adult had been requested. Yet it
seems that the interpretation most consistent with the intent of
Miranda would be to consider a juvenile's request for an adult as
equivalent to a request for an attorney. The Court is correct in its
decision not to allow a nonattorney to substitute for counsel, since
only a lawyer is adequately trained to provide a person with the
guidance and protection needed. However, the Court is in error to
attach no per se significance to a juvenile's plea for help via his
request for some trusted adult.
Nevertheless, until Michael C. is reversed or states enact clear,
protective legislation, those members of our society with the least
ability to protect themselves from oppressive police practices also
command the least protection from the courts.

